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A TRAGIC VIEW
OF POVERTY LAW PRACTICE
Paul R. Tremblay*
INTRODUCTION

Poverty lawyers, we are told, can do as much harm as good for their clients.
This humbling theme has been a fixture in the literature and research
surrounding the role of lawyers for the poor for some time. The theme
captures several deep truths about poverty law. It reminds us that lawyers for
the poor can, and do, exclude their clients in the work that they do, view the
lives of clients through the distorted prism of law training and law practice, and
tend to expend their energies on remedies and processes, largely litigation
oriented, which are unlikely to lead to meaningful change in the lives of the
poor. Well-intentioned lawyers for the disadvantaged tend to reproduce with
their clients the subordination from which clients seek to escape.
This article attempts to offer a preliminary critique of a vision of practice
that has emerged in recent years in response to the theme just described. In
light of the contradictions, paradoxes, and 'antinomies' of lawyering for the
disadvantaged, several writers have begun to craft'a method of practice that
emphasizes and fosters the goal of empowerment of clients. lhis emerging
vision, which I will refer to in this article as the Critical View (while
acknowledging that the various authors upon whom I draw do not speak with
one voice), hopes to transform poverty law and render it less paradoxical, and
less disempowering. It is a valuable, appealing, and instructive vision. In its
expression of a radical method of interacting with dependent people, it compels
those who work with the poor to reconsider in fundamental ways the
assumptions and biases of their practice.
For this vision to be truly transformative, however, it must offer realistic
possibilities of altering the day-to-day life and practice of poverty lawyers.
Critical View adherents would appear to agree with this normative construct.
Their vision takes the form of a "Theory of Practice," with the Practice
perspective as essential. This article, expressing what I might call the Tragic
View, questions the likelihood of a true transformation of poverty law practice
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within the street level bureaucracy characteristic of a typical legal services
office, where the most significant poverty lawyering occurs. I disagree very
little with the critique propounded by the Critical View, but I suggest that its
proposals to restructure this kind of lawyering rest on insufficiently developed
theories of autonomy, and neglect in important ways the conflicting pressures
upon the lawyers who encounter the daily struggles of the poor. A
transformative model of poverty lawyering may indeed be possible along the
lines suggested by the Critical View, but we ought to remain fairly skeptical
until we are satisfied that adequate means exists for confronting the individual
crises that are inevitable in legal services practice.
This article will proceed as follows. Part I will describe briefly the Critical
View, first in its critique of traditional poverty law practice and second in its
proposals for a new vision of the poverty lawyer/poor client interaction. Part
H1 will highlight my concerns about the proposed new vision of practice. It
will offer my Tragic View of this landscape, a view that confronts the informed
consent and triage considerations which ineluctably limit our hopes for a more
perfect lawyering world.

L THE CRrTcIAL VIEW
A. The Critique of TraditionalPoverty Law Practice

The concerns that inspire the Critical View have been with us at least since
Jean Cahn and Edgar Calm published their pioneering article on poverty law
in 1964.' The Cahns' proposed "civilian perspective" on the War on Poverty
was intended as a rebellion against the centralized, comprehensive, and
professionalized poverty programs that they observed being established under
President Johnson's noble campaign to eradicate economic inequality. They
correctly noted that professional poverty programs excluded the voice of clients
in their structure and design.' The Calms suggested that programs for the poor

"amplifyfl not [only] the voices of dissent but the voices of silence."3 To

demonstrate their thesis, the Cahns described in some detail a poverty law

1. See Calm & Cahn,The War on Poverry: A Civilian Perspecive, 73 YALE Li. 1317 (1964)[hereinafter
War on Poverty].
2. Id. at 1332. The 'one necessary characteristic" of an effective poverty program is that 'it voice the
concerns of individuals in their capacity as citizens.'
3. Id at 1333.
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practice that might incorporate this civilian perspective.4 Their practice vision
was democratic and participatory in spirit,5 but its design could not resist the
divisions between a professional perspective and a community-based
perspective.6 The Cahns' poverty law firm tends to look rather conservative
from existing perspectives, with its reliance on conventional lawyering as a
base on which to develop community power!
The Calms opened the debate about the proper role of professionals in aiding
the dependent and disadvantaged by calling to our attention the propensity of

professionals to ignore the perspectives of those whom they seek to help or
serve. In the 28 years since the Cahns wrote their article, the level of discourse
on this isue has grown in sophistication and in breadth of perspective. The
Critical View that I will describe here is of more recent vintage, and rests
largely on the recent contributions of Tony Alfieri,' Lucie White,9 and Jerry

4. Id at 1334-52.
5. Thz proposed 'university affiliated, neighborhood law firm" was to 'stimulate leadership among the
coimmunity's present inhabitants." Id at 1334. Ve Cahns saw the law firm as responsive to the needs of
the coimmunity members, as empowering those members in ways that might be more imm:ditely effective
than would community organizing, and as effecting an increased 'responsiven= of offidals and private
parties to the equitable demands of the community's mambem" Id at 1346. A theme that pesists in the
Cahns's discussion is one of responsiveness to the agendas that the community presens,% rather than a more
professional-directed practice.
6. For instance, the authors struggled with an endemic dilemma of community-based la'yei ng, the
problem of'sacrificing an individual client to a *greater caus,' Id at 1348, and reconized the difficultics
presented by allowing the lawyers to decide whether to turn away clients whose cases were unpopular. Id
7. Id The Calms argue that lawyers can serve community organizations by offering their technical skills
to aid community members in 'implementing the civilian perspective." Id at 1336. I refer to their view as
-conservative' because it accepts fundamentally the benefits offered by the existing legal regim,, even as
it rebels against that regime. That view resembles what Lucie White has tenn d "l'wt
eonal
lawyering. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessonsfrom Driefontein on Lawyering and Power. 699 Worm_ L
REV.755 (1988) [einafter To Learn and Teach].
8. Alfieri, The Antinomles of Povery Law anda Theory of Dlalogic E-powrrnent. 16 N.Y.U. Rev. L
& Soc. Change 659 (1987-88) [hereinafter Antinomics]; Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Pracdce:
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE LJ.2105 (1991) [hereinafter Reconstrutve Poverty Law
Practice]; Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of Josephine V. 4 GEO. 1. LEO. E'rcs 619 (1991)

[hereinafter Speaking Out of Turn].
9. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuirt: Making Space for Clents to Speak, 16 N.Y.U.
Rav. L & Soc. COANOE 535 (1987-88) [hereinafter Mobilfzaton on the MarSlns]; White, Subordnataon,
RhetoricalSurvivalSkifl andSunday Shoes. Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. 0., 38 Buffalo L Rev. 1 (190)
[hereinafter Sunday Shoes]; White, Goldberg v. Kelly and the Paradox of Lawyerlng for the Poor, 56
BROOKLYN L REv.861 (1990) (hereinafter Paradox). See also To Learn and Teach. xapra note, at 7.

126

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

L6pez ° to this colloquy. Other writers have contributed significantly to the

development of the critique. 1 I choose to focus on these three authors and
their recent scholarship because they seem to express a most direct exhortation
for a new vision of the day-to-day practice of lawyering with the
disadvantaged. Their critique is complex, deep, and intricately developed, and
I am able only to highlight here two central themes that best capture their
vision. I can only apologize for my attempt at such simplification.
The first theme is one which I will call "client voice." The three authors
appear to share a largely coincident perspective on this theme, which
echoes-but also differs from-the Calms' "civilian perspective." The Critical
View "suggests a practice of lawyering which would continually cede to
'clients' the power to speak for themselves."1 3 In existing poverty lawyering,
"[v]oices are silenced and stories are forgotten. The voices silenced are the
voices of clients. The stories forgotten are the stories of client selfempowerment."1 ' Lawyers, according to this view, exclude client voice in
their endeavor to "re-present" clients. 5 This exclusion of voice is both literal,

10. L6pez, Reconcelving Civil Rights Practice:Seven Weeks In the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration,
77 Go. LJ.1603 (1989) [hereinafter Rebellious Collaboration];L6pez, Training Future Lawyers to Work
with the Politically and Socially Disadvantaged: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W.VA. L REV. 305
(1989) [hereinafter Anti-Generic Legal Education]; L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L REV. 1 (1984).
11. I cannot do justice in this footnote to the scholars and practitioner who have served to develop the
empowerment perspective, but certain significant contributions do warrant note here, and I will allude to their
contribution in this article. See, e.g., Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience,
34 NLADA Bfm cAsE 106 (1977); Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L REV. 469
(1984) [hereinafter sions of Practice]; Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical
Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, IIN.Y.U. REv. L & Socw. CH.O E 369 (1982-83); Abel, Law
Without Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism 32 UCLA L Rev. 474 (1985); Hodgkib,
Petitioningand the Empowerment Theory of Practice,96 YAM. LJ. 569 (1987); Sarat, ...The Law Is All
Over'%Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor. 2 YAL J.L & HUM. 343
(1990); Lesnick, The Wellsprings of Legal Responses to Inequality: A Perspective on Perspectives, 1991
Duke LJ. 413.
12. The Cahns were directly concerned with client voice in their development of the civilian perspective,
but their incorporation of client perspectives was more indirect than that proposed by the Critical View. The
Cahs viewed lawyers as more directive of the disputes that poor clients encounter, and they saw litigation
and traditional lawyering as more central to those disputes than does the more recent literature. See Cahn
& Calm, supra note 1.
13. White, Paradox,supra note 9, at 863.
14. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 8, at 2119.

15. Several authors have opted to hyphenate the term 'represent' to stress the word's basic thrust of
'presenting anew' another person's story, typically through translation of some sort. See Cunningham, A
Tale of Two Cliene. Thinking About Law as Language, 87 Mltc-. L REv. 2459 (1989); L6pez Lay
Lawyering,supra note 10, at 11-13; Ashe, Bad Mothers and Good Lawyers, (unpublished manuscript on file
with author) (each discussing "re-presentation).
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as clients actually speak less, either in meetings with their lawyers" or in
public proceedings," and figurative, as lawyers employ advocacy strategies
that distort client stories, and replace them with stories that more often reflect
lawyer perspectives instead.' 8 As Jerry L6pez writes, "Too often, especially
when working with the politically and socially subordinated, lawyers presume
that theirs is the only voice that counts. Clients, particularly those that are
relatively disempowered, frequently acquiesce in rather than challenge this
presumption. " 9 Poverty law practice ought to shift the storytelling from the
lawyer to the client; the critical measure of success of a practice will be the
faithfulness of the re-creation of client narrative.20
I see also a second theme in the Critical View literature, one which is
perhaps more subtle, diffuse, and difficult to articulate, but nonetheless plays
a central part in the construction of a true client-centered, empowerment-based
practice. This theme is also a more radical one. It questions the role of
conventional lawyering as an approach to the disputes that subordinated clients
bring to poverty lawyers.2 Lawsuits are notoriously poor means by which
to empower clients. Lawyers, nevertheless, are trained to see lawsuits as a
preferred, and at times the only, avenue for resolving disputes. The critics
point out that not only are lawsuits alienating for clients, separated as they are
from ordinary meaningful client experience and dominated as they are by
lawyer thought, but they idso make very little difference to client circumstances
in any larger sense. Courts on occasion may offer temporary relief for isolated
injustices, but the economic and political structures causing the injustices
remain unaffected.
Better, argues the Critical View, that lawyers work in a way which Jerry
L6pez calls "rebellious":

16.
17.
18.
19.

See Sarat, supra note 11, at 361.
See Alfiedi, Speaking Out of Turn, supra note 8, at 631; White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 9. at 49.
See Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 8. at 2119.
Ldpez, Rebellious Collaboration,supra note 10, at 1629.

20. Cunningham, supra note 15-(applying the 'translation' idea to lawyering generally. not just
lawyering for the disenfirndsed).
21. There is a question as well whether clients bring issues to lawyer. with Lawyemz relatively reactive,
or whether lawyers bring iss to poor clients, in a more proactive role. William Simon implies mor
support for the latter stance, see Simon, Visions of Practice,supra note 11, at 482-86, as does Tony Alfieri,
see Alfiesi, Antinomles, supra note 8, at 665. The reactive/proactive distinction echoes the differing views
of client individual autonomy discussed below. See notes 60-63 Infra and accompanying text.

128

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

In this idea-what I call the rebellious idea of lawyering against
subordination-lawyers must know how to work with, not just on behalf
In short, the rebellious idea of lawyering
of, subordinated people.
demands that lawyers (and those with whom they work) nurture
sensibilities and skills compatible with a collective fight for social
change."

According to the Critical View, existing practice privileges lawyer views of
dispute resolution technique, excludes client voices as irrelevant or interfering
with that technique, and as a result focuses lawyer and client energies on
that perpetuate and reinforce client
litigation-based remedies'
powerlessness.2 4

To claim that these poverty lawyers are benefitting their

clients in this endeavor is at best misleading, and at worst simply wrong. Tony
conducting such a
Alfieri, at least, appears to argue that poverty lawyers
25

practice begin to take on characteristics of oppressors.
B. The Reform of Practice.

The Critical View does not only critique existing poverty law practice; it
suggests the outlines of an alternative practice, focused on the goal of

22. Id. at 1608. see also Anti-Generic Legal Education, supra note 10.
23. This critique differs from a corresponding criticism of poverty law practice which complains that
lawyers for the poor, notably legal services lawyers, take their clients* legal claims less seriously than they
ought to. See Bellow, supra note 11, at 56-57 (challenging current practice of nms procesing client
disputes in legal services offices, and suggesting more trials, fewer quick settlements); Carlin & Howard,
Legal Representationand Class Justice, 12 UCLA L REV. 381,416-17 (noting 'perfunctory service'); Sarnt,
supra note 11, at 352-55 (legal services clients perceive their lawyers as not pressing claims with great zeal
and commitment). My suspicion is that both phenomena, contrary as they may seem, are driven by the same
.practice ideology of the legal services setting. See Tremblay, Toward a Community-Based Ethic of Legal
Services Practice, 37 UCLA L REv. 1101, 1108 (1990); see also discussion infra at notes 71-75 and
accompanying text.
24. The Critical View sees two related reasons for this perpetuation of powerless.nes. First, the client's
relationship with the lawyer is a dependent one, and thus repro'luces the hierarchy that otherwise dominates
the client's existence. Second, the use of a lawsuit (or even a shadow lawsuit device, such as negotiation
or administrative proceedings) exercises status quo power relations, accepts that status quo, and in doing so
siphons off energies that might have greater long term benefit focused on organizing for political and
economic power.
25. ']he habits of perception and interpretation dominant in the practice of poverty law... reify and
reproduce myths of legal efficacy, and inherent indigent isolation end passivity which sustain and reinforce
relations of power oppressive to the poor.' Allieri Antinomles, supra note 8, at 661. See also White,
Paradox,supra note 9, at 861 (conventional lawyering reproduces subordination).
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empowerment.
Critical View practice will incorporate client voice
"continually," to employ Lucie White's term.' One important method of
that incorporation is to ensure that the client's narrative is re-presented in the
lawyerly work product emerging from the attorney-client relationship. The
legal storytelling that occurs in pleadings, argument, negotiation, publicity, and
so forth ought to be the client's story, not the lawyer's reconceptualization of
that story. 2 Rather than "tailoring" the narrative the lawyer hears to fit
preexisting legal categories-a process which leaves clients mute-poverty
lawyers ought to engage in dialogue with clients to ensure as faithful a
translation of client story as possible.
Inclusion of client voice also implies more meaningful methods of
collaborating with clients on lawyering activity. Even politically sensitive and
client-centered' lawyers tend to work in isolation in developing work product,
even if their intent is to craft that product to accomplish goals determined and
directed by the clients. The Critical View argues against this separation of
function, and against this isolation. Tony Alfieri offers an example of what
this might mean. He is quite self-critical in his description of his earlier client
representation in a class action lawsuit challenging food stamp regulations for
his failure to include his client in the legal strategies underlying the litigation:
I did not fully include her in discussions regarding the constitutional and
statutory bases of her case or the strategy of litigation designed to attack
the food stamp regulations. Nor did I provide her with legal materials
(e.g., statutes, regulations, legislative history, case law) to explicate my
case theory and strategy.29

26. White, Paradox, supra note 13.
27. -Me intent is ... to understand and rectify the loss of client narratives in lawyer storytelling.
Alfier, Reconstructve Poverty Law, jupra note 8, at 2119. See also Speaking Our of Tirn, jupra note 8,
at 620-633; White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 9, at 49; Cahn, Defining FeminiLt Jgadon, 14 HARv.
WOMENS LJ. 1, 15-18 (1991); Cunningham, supra note 15.
28. Client-centeredness is the rather accepted phrase for a view of the awyer/,cient relationship that
argues for decisionmaking processes encouraging development of client values and client-chosen rem-dies.
It derives form the David Binder and Susan Price text on legal interviewing and counseling. D. Binder &
S. Price, Legal Interviewing and Counseling (1978). See also, Dinerstein, Client.CenteredCounseling:
Reappraisaland Refinement, 32 Ariz. L Rev. 501 (1990).
29. Alfieri, Reconsructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 8, at 2128. Jerry Lpez offers a similar
example in his fictional account of Martha and Jesse. Martha, the lawyer, develops a terrific plan for
beginning to explore multidimensional tactics in response to Jesse's apparent racial discrimination, and
Lpez, while lauding the plan, criticizes Jesse's absence from that proc. Iepe., Rebellious Collaboration,
Supra note 10, at 1657.
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More
These suggestions serve both process and substance goals."
meaningful, actual participation in the lawyering process empowers clients, in
ways which having their case handled by an attorney will not. In addition,
however, this participation may also have the benefit of increasing the
likelihood of achieving the goal of the representation, of "winning."3' Jerry
L6pez describes his fictional lawyer discussing her responsibilities to her clients
in a civil rights dispute as follows:
With respect to Jesse [the client], I imagine this would involve
maximizing his role in decisionmaking and seeking to portray, represent
and characterize in the lawsuit his and Sylvia's [his wife] life experience,
not only because this effort might be more politically satisfying but
3"
because it's likely to generate afarmore effective legal product.
I also read this same message in Lucie White's Sunday Shoes story and her
reflections upon it.33 White tells a powerful story of the struggle between a
legal services lawyer and her client to fashion the most appropriate presentation
of the client's welfare hearing. The client rebels at the hearing and tells her
story, in her own voice, in a way not anticipated by the lawyer in her
collaboration with the client, and ultimately prevails. White does not pretend
to offer us a neat "moral" for her story, as the characters and their histories are
complex and in flux, but it appears important to her telling of the story that the
client ultimately "won" the matter for which she sought the aid of the
lawyer.'

30. For a discussion of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values in the attorney-client
relationship, see Cunningham, supra note 15; Cahn, supra note 27, at 16-19.
31. "Winning' in this context instrumental goals-e.g., influencing a decisionmaker, negotiating a
satisfactory resolution to a dispute, etc. I use the term in contrast with process goals, which are intrinsic,
and which may be independent of substantive instnumental goals. Every representation has both elements.
I read the Critical View to argue (or perhaps to assume) that client collaboration assi. the accomplishment
of both.
32. .,pez, Rebe//ious Collaboration, supra note 10, at 1710 (emphasis added).

33. White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 9.
34. See aeLat 47. The lawyer had tried to 'collaborate' with Mrs. (3. in devising an advocacy plan. Yet
the terms of that 'dialogue' excluded Mrs. G.'s voice. Mrs. 0. was a better strategist than the lawyer-more

daring, more subtle, more fluent-in her home terrain. Tony Alfieri, similarly, tells the story of Josephine
V., his chent who ospeaks out of turn' at her public assistance hearing, boldly and unconventionally so,
giving life to the voice that the lawyering had so suppressed. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn, supra note 8,
at 643. She, like Mrs. G., also won the hearing at which she spoke out. Id., at n.128.
Martha Fineman writes of the "morals' that audiences draw from the stories they hear. Fineman,
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Implementing what I have called the client voice theme in Critical View
practice would mean involving clients in lawyering activities in a fashion
which, it is fair to assume, greatly exceeds that of conventional lawyer/client
collaboration presently. In doing so, the Critical View asserts that the clients'
success on the matters for which they have consulted the lawyer will be
enhanced.
The Critical View's transformed vision of practice also stresses the
importance of community organization and collective activity. It understands
clients not as isolated victims, but as actors in a broader social fabric. It argues
for a professional duty of poverty lawyers to strive to form connections among
clients and among other disadvantaged people. This duty, which Tony Alfieri
calls the 'ethic of resistance, " " is central to the Critical View's thesis.'
Alfieri writes that "recognizing collective networks of resistance is
indispensable to recapturing the omitted stories of clients. "37 Jerry L6pez's
account of rebellious lawyering insightfully questions the effectiveness of
litigation to deal with the community tensions which his civil rights story
represents, while acknowledging at the same time the leverage the courts do
(sometimes) offer to the disempowered. The lawyer in his account offers this
possibility of a strategy that might prevail for her clients:
[M]y present conception of the ideal ultimate solution to the problem is
a collective, nonadjudicated discussion and negotiated end to police
harassment and forced exclusion of Latinos from Zalaipa. In order to
move toward such a solution, we are going to need time to help mobilize
the Latino community and to convince the Anglo leaders to listen and
38
bargain.

Dominant Discourse, Professional Language,and Legal Change in Child Cstody Dectsionnmaking, 101
HARV. L REV. 727 (1988). While implicit, the meaning we derive from the stories of leze, Mrs. 0., and
Josephine V. is that success in lawyered disputes is more likely if lawyers can learn to 'cede- the voice to
their clients.
35. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn, supra note 8, at 622.
36. It is fair to say that each of the authors cited in notes 8-12 supra, has relied on collective efforts
as essential to a truly radical poverty law practice.
37. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn, supra note 8,at 646. Alieri's earlier writing contains an even more
vocal call for developmen ofcommunities of clients to empower them to confront the oppression which th-y
have fEced individually and in isolation. See Andnomles, supra nort 8, at 704-710.
38. L6pez, Rebellious Colaboration,supra note 10, at 1668.
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Lucie White is also explicit in suggesting a rethinking of conventional
litigation strategies on behalf of the poor:
What, indeed, can advocates do? Rather than seeking any more remedies
for the poor, we might hesitate for a moment before filing another lawsuit,
even if we know exactly how to frame a winning claim. Instead, we
might look around us for spaces where poor people can talk among
themselves about what they want to do.39
The sentiments of the Critical View on the benefits of assisting the poor to
organize for collective action are not new, of course.4 They deserve our
close attention, however, even if they echo themes expressed before. The more
recent efforts to advocate a collective orientation to poverty law emerge from
a more sophisticated base, relying as they do on critical left philosophers,
critical race theory, and feminist notions of contextual and connected visions.
These efforts are therefore powerful, both in evocative and intellectual force.
The efforts appear to comprise a more coherent paradigm of radical practice,
and to offer suggestions which transcend the prior distinctions between
individual casework, impact litigation, and community bonding efforts. That
coherence adds to the force of the Critical View, and at the same time
necessitates increased, if still appreciative, scrutiny.

II. THE CRITICAL VIEW ASSESSED: A TRAGIC PERSPECTIVE

The vision of practice I have just described has great attraction. It captures
and builds upon values I share, and that most poverty lawyers ought to, and
likely will, embrace. It is descriptively correct. Lawyering for the poor as

39. White, Paradox,supra note 9, at 887. See also White, Mobili.ation on the Margins, supra note 9,
at 546 (conceding that the ends of that collective conversation would not be to effect judicial change, but
to accomplish the 'broader goalo" of 'a momentary experience in the exercise of power'). Howard Lesnck
offers a similar view of lawyering which he terms 'radical,' as contrasted with "liberal' or 'conservative,"
which would "communalize the representation ofa client... in the more fundamental sense of enabling [the
client] to see that the problem presented to him by [the client's adversary] is one that he has in common with
others, and that one route to his empowerment is for him to seek solutions as part of a community.'
Lesnick, supra note 11, at 438.
40. Jean and Edgar Cahn were concerned with collective efforts in their early writing about poverty law
practice. See War on Poverty, supra note 1,at 1351. See also Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People,
79 YALE LJ. 1049, 1053 (1970); Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE LJ. 1069 (1970).
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presently constituted is disempowering for poor cliehts. It is normatively
attractive as well. A practice that serves to begin to empower clients (or even
to disempower less), and that might effect the beginning changes in the
political landscape for disadvantaged persons warrants serious attention.
Poverty lawyers need to engage consistently in self-reflection about how their
practice impacts on their client community, including ways in which their work
and their ideologies impact on clients in ways that may be ignored or
overlooked. The Critical View represents that reflective stance at its best.
While I am seduced by the Critical View, at the same time I find myself
questioning several of its suggestions, and this section of this Article will begin
to sketch out my concerns. My limited purpose here is to pose questions about
how the Critical View vision can work A Theory of Practice perspective must
be vigilant on that score. The questions will revolve around two notions-the
role of autonomy in the new vision of practice, and the reconciliation of the
triage function with the teaching of the Critical View.
These two concerns seem to reflect my bias that the Critical View ought to
acknowledge more satisfactorily the context of legal services practice: the high
volume, perpetual crisis, "emergency room" milieu of the neighborhood
office. 4' This bias contains within it at least two assumptions. It assumes
that a Theory of Practice for poverty law ought to account for legal services
practice. While.the Critical View clearly applies to lawyering for subordinated
clients outside the legal services setting,42 by far most lawyering for the poor
will occur within the subsidized legal aid milieu. My bias also assumes that
the legal services offices where the poverty law takes place will in fact
resemble "emergency room" settings, and because of that will be bound, in
some fashion, by triage principles. This second assumption seems to me less
self-evident. The Critical View could argue for a design of legal services
practice that does not become bound by triage considerations. As I discuss

41. I suppose Iam now confirming the prophesy of Tony Alfieri, who wrote, "The joining of thery
and practice (which he was espousing] may disenchant some in the poverty law community. They may fairly
object that theory is too remote from the upheaval of daily practice to be of u.e.' Alfieri, Reconstructve
Poverty Law, supra note 8, at 2120. Alfieri's prediction is close to the mark. I do not find the theory to
be of no use, but I do believe that its neglect of the 'upheaval- is a failing.
42. See, e.g., LUpez, Rebellious Collaboradon,supra note 10, (private counsel litigating civil rights
matter). Jerry Lpez points out that much of the civil rights work that occurs emanates from private law
offices, see Ud at 1611, but that should not imply that most lawyering activity for poor persons is handled
by non-public zource
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below, 3 I find this possibility unlikely, and therefore I take my two
assumptions to be reasonable ones.
Let me first explore the autonomy issues I see as critical here, and the first
of those attaches to the "client voice" theme. The argument that client voice
be taken more seriously has several consequences, some of which appear to be
without any foreseeable drawbacks. For instance, it is hard to disagree with the
proposition that lawyers ought to be faithful to the stories clients bring to the
interaction, be empathic to the needs, feelings, and values of the clients, and
not substitute lawyer goals for client goals." This lesson, which is contained
within the Critical View, merely reflects current ethical teaching."' I see the
Critical View as far more than a sophisticated version of Binder & Price,
however. The "client voice" theme I have described calls for a level of
collaboration and a view of the attorney-client relationship that does raise
intriguing consequences.
The collaborative suggestions seem to impact on the intrinsic goals in the
representation (the storytelling function-ensuring that clients are heard), as well
as the instrumentalgoals in the representation (accomplishing the results sought
when the client consulted a lawyer). As Naomi Cahn notes, it may be as
significant for a client to have her story heard in a meaningful way as it is to
win her case on the merits." Clark Cunningham's stories remind us of the
same thing.4 7 What must be addressed, however, is the tradeoff that may
result in any given lawyer/client encounter between intrinsic and instrumental
ends. The Critical View largely elides this question.
The Critical View literature implies that intrinsic and extrinsic goals are not
in conflict and may even dovetail. For instance, Lucie White and Tony Alfieri
tell stories of clients who expose their own voices, contrary to the strategy
judgment of their respective lawyers. In doing so, each client is empowered

43. See note 71, infra and accompanying text.

44. As Carl Hosticka, among others, has shown, lawyers, and particularly legal services lawyers, often
do not meet this ethical standard of practice in fact. Hosticka, We Don't Care About What Happened. We
Only Car About What is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations of Reality, 26 Soc. PRODLEMs 599
(1979).
45. See, e.g., D. BINDER, P. BERGMAN & S. PRIcE, LAwuEts AS CoUNsELORs (1990); D. BINDER &
S. PRICE, supra note 28.
46. Cahn, supra note 27, at 17.
47. Cunningham, supra note 15, at 2492.
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by the process and prevails on the merits.4 8 But the question remains: What
if, in those stories, the client had lost? What if the lawyer's judgment, limited
in scope and vision as it was, and focused as it was on regulatory arguments
and advocacy technique, had been correct in its predictions about the conduct
of the decisionmaker?
There is some reason to suppose that powerless people may benefit, in (short
term) instrumental terms, from having their stories translated by lawyers into
"logic of the law." The Critical View authors themselves teach us why this

risk is ever present. Lucie White's rich discussion in two of her articles49 of
the political implications of language educates us that 'patterns of talk which
socially powerless people typically use in informal courts may not 'articulate'
well with the logic of the law."5° Similarly, Jerry L6pez's article on lay
lawyering demonstrates that effective advocacy will imploy 'stock stories"
which take into account the decisionmaker's view of the world."'
That there are serious costs in intrinsic terms (as well as in long term
instrumental terms) in the translation of client stories by lawyers is an insight
we often overlook, and the Critical View is impressive in reminding us of that
consequence. Once having recognized those costs, however, an autonomy
perspective would argue that the matter must be addressed in terms of informed
consent. In other words, if -there is a chance of instrumental -gains at the
expense of intrinsic, one would expect that-everything else being equal (which

48. White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 9; Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn, supra note 8. See notes 30.34
and accompanying text Mrs. G. in Lucie White's narrative opts, to the surprise of her Lawyer, to justify her
spending of a lump sum recovery on items such as 'Sunday shoes' for her children. White indicates that
such an expense did not qualify as appropriate under the applicable regulations, and the client's surprise
testimony did not comport with the legal theory developed by the lawyer (with actively if perhaps
unsuccessfully invited input from the client). Josephine V. in Tony Alfieri's story speaks out of turn- at
her welfare hearing, and offers an impassioned account of her strength amid oppressive poverty. Her
speaking out is described by Alfieri as against the judgment of her lawyer, whame legal thtory unwittingly
suppressed her narrative. As noted, both Nrs. 0. and Josephine V. won their welfare hearings.
49. White, Mobilfzaron on the Margins, supra note 9, at 543 n.35; Sunday Shoes, supra note 9, at 1419.
50. White, Mobilization on the Margins, supra note 9, at 543 n.35, citing OA R & Cow Y,RULEs
VEtsus RELA'ioxs s IN SMALL CLAms DISUTE, IN CoNCT TALx (A. Grinshaw ed.) (19S9).
51. Lpez, Lay Lawirering, supra note 10, at 9,29,45.
Intelligibility demands that Son tell a story that Man can se and hear as on- of his own stock stories.
To do that most effectively, Son must understand what it means to tell a story that Man would be
willing to adopt as his own version of his relationship to Mom in the circumstances.
Id., at 29.
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it may not be in a legal services context, if one adopts a triage ethic"2)-a
client will decide which is preferred.
The Critical View does not reject client-centeredness on this score. It tends
not to capture the choice at all, in that it sees client collaboration as
instrumentally effective as well as intrinsically effective.5 3 Again, it is
important to distinguish the Critical View's collaboration lesson from more
traditional notions of client-centeredness. The latter model has been justified
as producing "better results," since the client is the only true judge of what is
Client-centeredness permits clients to make
most important to him.'
"unwise" decisions once fully informed about consequences. The Critical
View's collaboration method also sanctions such client-directed
decisionmaking, and in doing so is consonant with the existing ethical model.
But the Mrs. G. and Josephine V. stories are qualitatively different in their
teaching, if I read them correctly. They redefine the lawyer's role in the
counseling process. Rather than ask the client to choose among options as
defined by the lawyer's legal analysis, these stories rely more directly on the
client's assessment of strategy, aiming both to achieve empowerment goals and
instrumental, success-related goals at once. My sense, and my reasons for
wanting to think more carefully about the Critical View lesson, is that in many
cases that reliance may be subject to some more or less substantial risks to the
merits of the case, in which case those risks must then be processed according
to informed consent standards.
Saying that informed consent needs to be factored into the discussion merely
introduces two additional complex considerations. The frst is that many
clients who come to a legal services office, if faced with the choice, will opt

52. The triage obligations of a legal services office might create very difficult choices on this score.
See discussion below, infra at notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
53. Lucie White does consider in her discussion of the three 'ideal types' of activist lawyers the
possibility that, in impact litigation contexts, a 'lawyer and client may choose to ... sacrifice a favorable
outcome precisely in order to make the litigation speak most effectively to public consciousness." White,
To Learn and Teach, supra note 7, at 759. Her discussion there, however, assumes a joint goal of political
change, and she does not address the process by which a client is confronted with the initial question of
defining the ends of the representation.
54. The "better results" argument was first posed by Mark Spiegel. Spiegel, Lawyertng and Client
Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L RLrv. 41, 85 (1979). See also
DINERSuTN, supra note 28, at 544-46.
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for instrumental ends over intrinsic ends when they are in conflict." Because
clients come to legal services lawyers when they are in crisis (with income,
housing, health, or safety in rather immediate jeopardy), we are not surprised
by this choice. The second is that those clients who do opt for intrinsic ends
at the expense of instrumental ends will force poverty lawyers to confront very
difficult triage questions. These triage considerations will be developed
below."
If cient-centeredness and autonomy concerns inform (and complicate) the
storytelling notion, they also achieve significance in the Critical View's
proposals about creative, empowering lawyering methods. Consider the
following lesson from Tony Alfieri:
My thesis is that poverty cannot-indeed should not-be remedied by these
[conventional lawyering] traditions. Remedial litigation should not be
mounted, even where altruistic relief is possible, without the activization
of class consciousness among the poor, nor without the political
organization and mobilization of the poor.-"
Alfieri's plea is persuasive, given his premises (poverty lawyer's mandate is
to empower the poor, empowerment only can be achieved by collective.

efforts).

Other Critical View writers have expressed similar sentiments."

What seems missing from this plea, however, is the client's participation and
59
engagement inthe choice of goals.
The methods I shall term 'collective' promise substantial long term benefit
but at some recognizable cost-the foregoing of short term gain. To argue that

55. For instance, if 'speaking out at a welfare hearing is likely to decease the chances of obtaining
a successful ruling firom the administrative law judge, then the client must decide whether the participatory
benefits of speaking out will outweigh the risk that doing so will lend to a loss of the welfare benefits at

issue in the proceeding.
56. See notes 70-71 infra
and aecompanying text.
57. Alfieri Antnomles, supra note 8, at 664.
58. White, Paradox, supra note 9, at 885; .46pez, Rebellious Collaboradon, supra note 10, at 1669,
1709.

59. In this regard this criticism recalls Stephen Mlrnanns obsrvation that the Blnder & Price counzzling
and interviewing models were patenmalistic in their instruction to lawyers to impose a model of conversation
(cient-centeredness) upon clients without the latter's input into that choice. Ellmann, ayers and Cllenr,
34 UCLA L REv. 717 (1987).
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lawyers possess a professional duty' to adopt collective remedies is to assume
some consent on the part of clients to engage in those remedies, or to assume
some basis for foregoing that consent. A traditional autonomy perspective
would suggest a process of dialogue leading to client-centered decisions on
how to proceed.6 ' The emphasis in Critical View literature on faithfulness to
client voice implies acceptance of this view of autonomy. There is another
view of autonomy, captured best perhaps by the writing of William
Simon, 2which argues in favor of less reliance on client description and
reporting of values, interests, and judgments, and instead cedes to the lawyer
greater responsibility for effecting (and affecting) the development of client
self-determination.
I sense disagreement of the Critical View with the
Simon perspective, but I may be wrong in that assessment, and the Critical
View writers may not agree among themselves on how to approach that issue.
What does seem evident is that this autonomy configuration as it applies to the
Critical View practice suggestions needs much greater exploration.
Having said this, I will note that the conventional autonomy principle
appears to interfere somewhat with the Critical View's collective emphasis.
The Critical View must recognize the possibility that poor clients, facing a
choice between the long term, speculative rewards of collective, organizing
efforts and the short term, less speculative (if perhaps more illusory) benefits
of individual dispute resolution technique, often will opt for the latter, based
on the urgency of their circumstances. A Theory of Practice that compels"
collective efforts must confront the client role in the adoption of that ethic. If,
on the other hand, one argues that lawyers must encourage clients to become
empowered, and to engage collectively, and not rely on client initiative on that

60. The literature often employs language of duty in its discussion of collective, empowering lawyering
methods. See, e.g., Alfiei, Aninomles, supra note 8, at 664 (remedial litigation 'should not be mounted"
without empowerment measures). Lucie White and Jeny L6pez describe the duty more in process terms,
arguing that lawyers for the poor have an obligation to understand and to consider collective remedie. See
White, Paradox, supra note 9, at 887; Lpez, Rebellious Collaboration, supra note 10, at 1608.
61. See, e.g., BINDER,BERoMtol& PRicE, LAwYERS AS COUNSELORS 16-23 (1991); Dinerstein, supra
note 28, at 512-16.
62. See Simon, Visions of Practice, supra note 11, at 488 (lawyer's role is to enhance client's ability
to express interests, and 'to consider that people have interests of which they are not aware"); Simon, Ethical
Discretion in lawyerlng, 101 HARV. L REV. 1083, 1125 (autonomy is not self-evident trump of other
values); Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L REV. 213 (1991).
63. For a critique of the Simon view, see Dinetstein, supra note 28, at 556-66.
64. See Alfier, Antinomles, supra note 8, at 664.
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front, one must then reconcile that activism with the notably anti-activist tone
of the Critical View in its reliance on client voice.
The other response to the autonomy question is an institutional one. A legal
services program might opt to focus its efforts only on those clients who agree
to participate in collective reform efforts. Having done so, the institution will
have defined away this informed consent question, as is its presumptive
institutional right.s Whether an office possesses ethical justification for doing
so, or whether the program might also choose to deprive clients of an informed
consent choice regarding individual, intrinsic remedies, requires some thought
about triage. The triage implications of the Critical View's teachings are
significant."
There are two ways in which the Critical View's ideas impact on the triage
function. The first observation is that the Critical View's long view, its
empowerment view approaching a professional obligation, will face very
tangible obstacles at the street level. The more that a legal services office
assumes the role of the community's legal emergency room, the more difficult
it will be to stress, as the Critical View does, a focus on long term remedies.
In a perfect world the poor would have the legal equivalent of both emergency
rooms and public health planning resources. In our imperfect world the poor
have but one institution, the legal services office. It is unlikely, given itsassignment as savior of last resort, that the institution will be capable of
adopting the long view, particularly that suggested by the Critical View. A
long view that still seeks institutional change within the system (Lucie White's
"first-dimensional" (or even "second-dimensional") lawyering') offers some
concrete expectation to clients in need; a long view that seeks more substantive,
structural change outside the existing system (White's "third-dimensional
lawyering") might be more difficult for programs to justify ethically if clients
are suffering presently. 8
65. Several writers have explicated the justifications for an institutional legal services program to focus
on long term change for the benefit of many, at the expense of short term, individual efforts. See Bellow
& Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarciry and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58
B.U.L. REv. 337 (1978); LtuAN, LAwYERS A
JusTIc. AN E'rrcAL.STuDY 306-310 (1988).
66. 1 have addressed the triage implications of legal services practice e lswhere. Tremblay, supra note
23. The discussion that follows in the text builds on the ideas I expressed there.
67. White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 7, at 755-57.
68. The difference in attractiveness seems grounded in the degree of.speculanon inherent in each route.
Collective efforts will continue to feel more speculative than, say, a class action La'suiL This is partly
because the lawyers are the decisionmakers, iee Tremblay, supra note 23, at 1138-39. but partly because we
have less experiences upon which to draw to make firm predictions in the collective realm. Only if the
Critical View persuades us that intra-system efforts make no realdifferencewill this inequality in speculation
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Institutionally, much pressure will exist to confront the immediacy of the
crises of clients' lives. The emergency room model of legal services practice
will justify an ethical triage process that prioritizes immediate need, and
deprioritizes the long term benefit of empowerment. The Critical View
challenges this choice of priorities, but wanes in influence on this question by
the inherent speculativeness of the benefits which it offers. That is not to say
that it is wrong in its prediction; rather the Critical view poses an argument that
is difficult to sustain among the actual decisionmakers in the face of immediate
pain among clients asking for assistance."
What I have just outlined is a descriptive, psychological view of the poverty
law context. It is not necessarily a normative view. The normative question
is whether a triage process favoring the short term and immediate over the long
term and less immediate is an ethically justifiable one. That question must be
left for another day." My point here is that the Critical View tends not to
incorporate in its critique the context that demands such a triage. I do not read
the Critical View as defining triage out of the picture. One might seek to
implement the Critical View's practice models in a way that minimized triage,
but that structure would then violate, it seems, many of the important values
expressed by the Critical View. Triage seems avoidable only by structural
limitations on representation, which limitations would descend from above,
from the institutional hierarchy. The inclusion of client narrative, client life
experience, and client voice plainly implies much individual contact, and
individual contact plainly implies triage.7 '

evaporate. While some may argue that extra-systemic methods are in fact as ordered and predictable as intrasystemic methods, see Simon, Visions of Practice, supra note 1II at 496 n.68, it will call for substantial
education to overcome the feeling that intra-system work is less speculative.
69. See Lesnick, supra note 1i, at 449 (the failings of a radical perspective are that the very integrity
of its critique disables it from addressing 'the here-and-now of particular issues, which invariably arise out
of a context that from a radical perspective is pervasively flawed').
70. 1 intend to continue to explore that question in a forthcoming Essay in the Hastings Law Journal's
Symposium on the Theoretics of Practice. See Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and
Street Level Bureaucracy,43 HAsT.LJ.(1992) (forthcoming).
71. This issue needs to be developed at greater length, but it appears that triage will be inevitable in a
legal services context unless one radically redesigned a neighborhood office (or. perhaps, eliminated the idea
of neighborhood offices) to control representation decisions based upon factors other than triage. Those
factors will inevitably be reflective of larger community needs (certain kinds of welfare or housing disputes,
e.g.), and the more that the institutional mission is driven by that kind of objective, the greater the
interference in the value of client voice and individual client collaboration. For further discussion of the
conflict between the role of individual clients and of larger community goals, see Tremblay, supra note 23,
at 1124-29.
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The second triage point is one that is far more tentative and disconcerting,
but one deserving some thought. For it I return to Tony Alfieri's recounting
of his experience with his food stamp litigation.' His self-criticism, really
criticism directed to poverty lawyers generally, challenged lawyering that
excluded the poor from active participation in the details of their legal work.
He asserts that clients will be empowered by that participation, and, since client
empowerment is the goal of poverty law practice, such active collaboration is
essential.
But how does that assertion confront the reality of triage? If there is a
distinction between instrumental and intrinsic needs of clients, and if we
assume a single office available to all the poor in the community, it might be
argued that it is not unfair for the institution to justify a preference for
instrumental goals over intrinsic goals. This supposition deserves much more
thought, for it has a visceral unpleasantness. But, in thinking of Alfieri's
example, do we fault a legal services office for litigating a food stamp action
without teaching clients about the role of regulations and statutes, if that
decision is based on the principle of serving more people? Such collaboration
has important benefits, but it is accomplished directly at the price of excluding
other clients entirely.
In the article in -which Alfieri insists on the collaborative lawyering just
described, he relates that on the day that his food stamp client came to the
office for assistance, 30 or 40 prospective clients were screened at the door.
Of those, 10 or 12 ultimately were found 'worthy' of consideration for
representation. 73 It seems to be a fair inquiry, and an important ethical
inquiry, to wonder whether the lawyers who choose to educate clients less
about the complexities of their case in order to have time to offer some
representation to other excluded clients are not modeling a more effective
poverty law practice.
One possible, and one might say likely, consequence of the triage
perspective as applied to the food stamp client is that the process will privilege
instrumental concerns over intrinsic concerns where the choice between the two
seems stark. An example will make this point clear. Clark Cunningham has
described "The Case of the Silenced Lawyer, " 74 a prisoner whom
Cunningham's office represented by appointment of the federal court. The

72. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 8. See note 29. supra and accompanying
text.
73. Alfieri Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice, supra note 8,at 2122 (the scare quotes are Afieri's).
74. Cunningham, supra note 15, at 2465-69.
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matter when referred by the court was framed as a civil rights case, and the
clinical students saw immediate due process arguments, around which they
developed their brief. The client's "story," however, was very different-so
different that he discharged the counsel because their "translation" of his theory
into more conventional doctrine violated his integrity. 7"
Cunningham's narrative, while teaching several important insights, offers an
example of a difference between client "voice" and lawyer "voice." The client
seemingly had a chance to "win" with the lawyers' arguments, but "winning"
was not what was important to him, at least not if he was deprived of his story
in the process. In this way the narrative exemplifies a central theme of the
Critical View-the ways in which lawyers misunderstand and distort client lives.
At the same time his narrative also shows us the tragedy of triage, for in a
legal services setting his need to have his ("losing") story expressed would be
given, I suspect, very low priority. Client-centeredness would suggest that he
craft his case as he, and not his lawyer, sees fit, but triage would interfere to
say that he could not have access to a lawyer to assist him to do so.
CONCLUSION

Any real conclusion would seem out of place for this article, for it offers
only questions and inquiries that deserve further exploration. My purpose has
been to embrace the Critical View for its persistent defense of subordinated
clients in an arena where their voices are too often suppressed. At the same
time I have sought to question how the ideals of the Critical View might be
reconciled, even if they indeed will be compromised, with the street-level
bureaucracy of most poverty law practices. Perhaps I am too pessimistic; my
inability to accept easily the improved vision of practice might reflect my
entrenchment in the present system.76 In any event, the questions I pose are
real to me and a truly meaningful theory of practice will seek to address
questions of empowerment in a regime characterized by great scarcity and great
misery.

75. The client's theory was that the entire disciplinary system at the prison was unconstitutional.
Cunningham implies that this argument was not one that the students were comfortable arguing. Id. at 246667.
76. See Lesnick, supra note 11, at 439-454.

